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INTRODUCTION
Exclusive dealing is a desirable practice in many industries.1 It is also the subject
of numerous antitrust lawsuits and opinions. Despite the abundance of exclusive
dealing commentary, broad anti-exclusive dealing statutes have escaped analysis until
recently. In 2006 and 2007, however, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth2 and Eighth
Circuits 3 addressed Minnesota's 4 and Tennessee's 5 anti-exclusive dealing laws. In
both opinions, the courts tried to reconcile the viability of exclusive deal clauses with
statutes that prohibit manufacturers from "coercing" dealers into entering into exclusive
contracts. This Article examines those decisions and offers an antitrust-inspired
framework for analyzing alleged "coercion."
Part I defines exclusive dealing and then turns to the emergence of state anti-
exclusive dealing statutes. This Part explains that although many states have enacted
such statutes, it is difficult to discern what legislatures meant when they forbade
coercive demands for exclusive deals.
"Christopher E. Ware received his J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School. He is a shareholder at
Reinhart Boemer Van Deuren s.c., where he co-chairs the White Collar Corporate Compliance Group and is a
member of the Product Distribution and Franchise Law Group.
t Alison A. Hill received her J.D., cum laude, from the University of Notre Dame Law School. She is an
associate at Reinhart Boemer Van Deuren s.c. and is a member of the Product Distribution and Franchise Law
Group.
1. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
2. See NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 246 F.App'x
929 (6th Cir. 2007).
3. See Minnesota Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2006).
4. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2) (West 2007).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1304(3) (West 2007).
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From there, this Article in Part II examines the Sixth and Eighth Circuit anti-
exclusive dealing statute cases. The federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals
all faced the same dilemma: how to balance the manufacturers' right to ask for and
receive an exclusive deal with legislative prohibitions. The two Circuits reached
facially different results: one overturning the district court's finding that the
manufacturer violated the anti-exclusive dealing statute and the other upholding the
district court's finding of a violation. Both courts, however, focused on whether the
manufacturer "coerced" the dealer into complying with the parties' latest exclusive deal.
We believe that focus caused the Eighth Circuit to ignore legislative intent in favor of
upholding exclusive deals 6 and caused the Sixth Circuit to defer fully addressing the
coercion dilemma.
7
In Part III, the authors explain how to solve the coercion dilemma. We begin by
using antitrust analysis to identify the proper niche for anti-exclusive dealing statutes.
We then show how identifying that niche and antitrust analysis leads to several
conclusions and ultimately a framework that courts can follow to properly assess
whether a manufacturer coerced a dealer into entering into an exclusive deal.
Finally, in Part IV, this Article applies the suggested framework to the Sixth and
Eighth Circuit cases and, in so doing, shows that those courts did not actually determine
whether the manufacturers coerced their respective dealers.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-EXCLUSIVE DEALING STATUTES AND THE COERCION
QUESTION
"Exclusive dealing" is a dealer's promise to a manufacturer that it will not sell
competing products.8  It offers a variety of potential benefits to manufacturers,
including reduced intrabrand competition (which enhances interbrand competition),
9
lower transaction costs, 10 and a greater ability to protect confidential information from
competitors.
Like any other vertical restraint, exclusive dealing can harm society by reducing
competition. Thus, exclusive dealing is probably illegal when practiced by a
monopolist to exclude rivals and when enough of the market is foreclosed to harm the
competitive process. 12 Short of such foreclosure, the Supreme Court "has recognized
6. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., LEE N. ABRAMS, The Standard of Legality: Per Se or Rule of Reason?, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF SELLING AND BUYING § 1:29, 1-35-36 (Philip F. Zeidman, ed., West 3d ed. 2006) (1993).
9. Cf Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007) (discussing the
procompetitive effects of reduced intrabrand competition on interbrand competition).
10. Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, "No Economic Sense" Makes No Sense for Exclusive
Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 784-85 (2006).
11. See NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 366 F. Supp.
2d 597, 603-04 (W.D. Tenn. 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.App'x 929 (6th Cir. 2007).
12. See Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000) (prohibiting exclusive dealing that "substantially
lessen[s] competition or tend[s] to create a monopoly"). When applying the Clayton Act to exclusive dealing,
courts usually "pose two basic questions: (I) whether there was actually a sale conditioned on Buyer's
agreement... and (2) whether that agreement foreclosed a significant portion of the market to [competitors]."
HARVEY M. APPLEBAUM, May Seller Restrict What Buyer Buys and Resells?, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELLING
AND BUYING, supra note 8, § 4:40, at 4-95-96; see also Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing,
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that [exclusive dealing] arrangements may have procompetitive effects and may be
motivated by other than anticompetitive desires on the part of the seller."
' 13
Accordingly, since the 1980s, courts have routinely upheld exclusive dealing
arrangements. 14
Yet this judicial approval has not spread to state legislatures. The number of state
anti-exclusive dealing statutes is increasing. 15  State anti-exclusive dealing statutes
prevent manufacturers from "coercing" dealers into refusing to purchase products from
a manufacturer's competitor. 16  Since 2000, ten states have enacted anti-exclusive
dealing laws. 17 The addition of these ten states means that now nearly half of the
country prevents manufacturer-coerced exclusive dealing in equipment dealership
contracts. 18 What it means for a manufacturer to "coerce" a dealer into accepting an
"Foreclosure, " and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 327 (2002) (noting that courts now look to
whether exclusive dealing raised prices or decreased output, not to simple foreclosure). Courts also look at
the overall impact on competition. See APPLEBAUM, supra, at 4-96.
13. ABA SEC. ANTITRUST L., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 215 (5th ed. 2002).
14. See Jacobson, supra note 12, at 324 (noting that Supreme Court rulings coupled with the Chicago
School's laissez-faire approach to vertical economic restraints contributed to a trend towards upholding
exclusive dealing arrangements).
15. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
16. For purposes of this Article, "anti-exclusive dealing statutes" refers only to those laws preventing
manufacturers from "coercing" dealers into selling inventory solely from that manufacturer. There are other
provisions in state equipment dealership statutes preventing dealer coercion. For example, statutes prevent
suppliers from "coercing" dealers into signing supplemental agreements unless imposed on all similarly
situated dealers in the state. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22902(b) (West 2006). Additionally, there
are laws preventing manufacturers from "coercing" dealers into purchasing additional inventory that the
dealer has not voluntarily ordered. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.832(1) (West 2006). These dealer
"coercion" laws are outside the scope of this Article.
17. See Act of July 1, 2004, ch. 2004-257, § 9(3)(j), 2004 Fla. Laws 873, 885 (codified at
§ 686.413(3)0)); Act of April 1, 2005, ch. 238, § 7(11), 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 730, 737 (codified at § 28-24-
103(11)); Act of April 22, 2004, ch. 144, § 11(3), 2004 Ky. Acts 545, 548 (codified at § 365.832(3));
Equipment Dealer Contract Act, ch. 433, § 2, 2005 Md. Laws 1999, 2010 (codified at § 19-301(3)); Act of
June 12, 2003, ch. 503, § 11(3), 2003 Nev. Stat. 3399, 3402 (codified at § 597.115.3); Act of July 24, 2001,
ch. 66, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 1022, 1031 (codified at § 66-187.1(3)); Fair Practices of Farm,
Construction, Industrial, and Outdoor Power Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and
Dealers, ch. 6, § 1, 2000 S.C. Acts 2495, 2508 (codified at § 39-6-110(B)); Act of May 2, 2002, § 2(3), 2002
Vt. Acts & Resolves 25, 26 (codified at § 4077a(3)); Equipment Dealers Protection Act, ch. 898, § 1, 2002
Va. Acts 2217, 2220 (codified at § 59.1-352.9(3)); Fair Practices of Equipment Dealers Act, ch. 107, § 1,
2006 Wyo. Sess. Laws 357, 360 (codified at § 40-20-114(a)(iii)).
18. Provisions preventing exclusivity are also found in other types of industry-specific statutes not
reviewed here. See, e.g., Florida Motor Vehicle Licenses Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.64(6) (West Supp.
2008) (effective July 1, 2007). This Article reflects research conducted under state general equipment and
farm equipment dealership statutes. Heavy industrial and construction dealership statutes were not included,
with the exception of Minnesota's Heavy and Utility Equipment Manufacturers and Dealers Act (HUEMDA).
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2) (West 2007). We included HUEMDA for the simple fact that it
was the statute at issue in Minnesota Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp. 472 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2) (West 2007)). For a discussion of Minnesota Supply, see infra Part
II.A.
Presently, twenty-three states have anti-exclusive dealing laws in their equipment dealership statutes:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
Additionally, New York and Oklahoma have pending anti-exclusive dealing legislation in both
branches of their legislatures. See Assemb. B. 8657, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A08657; S.B. 6166, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S06166; H.B. 1454, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007), available at
http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (click on "Status of Measures," then click on "Basic Search Form," then enter
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exclusive deal, however, remains unclear. Is merely asking for an exclusive deal
illegal, or must a dealer actually comply with the manufacturer's request for there to be
"coercion"? Similarly, does a manufacturer violate an anti-exclusive dealing law if it
threatens litigation to enforce an exclusive dealing clause?
There is no easy answer. The statutes 19 themselves do not provide guidance, and
most state legislatures passed their laws without any commentary. Although many of
HB1454 in the 2007 Regular Session); S.B. 1069, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007), available at
http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/ (click on "Status of Measures," then click on "Basic Search Form," then enter
SB 1069 in the 2007 Regular Session).
19. There are three types of anti-exclusive dealing statutes. For purposes of this Article, the salient
feature of each law is that they prevent a manufacturer from "coercing" a distributor into accepting exclusive
dealing.
(1) Under the basic anti-exclusive dealing laws, dealers are protected from manufacturers
coercing them into refusing to purchase equipment from another manufacturer.
Maryland's statute provides an instructive example of the basic anti-exclusive dealing
law: "A supplier may not ... [c]oerce a dealer into refusing to purchase equipment
manufactured by another supplier .... MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 19-301(3)
(LexisNexis 2005); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22902(k) (West Supp. 2008);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 322F.7.5 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.832(3) (West
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:483(3) (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.063(b)(2)
(West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-77-4(c) (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 597.115.3 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-187.1(3) (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-1304(3) (2001); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 19.22(b) (Vernon
2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4077a(3) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-352.9.3 (2006);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-20-114(a)(iii) (2007). Recall that Minnesota also has an
identical provision in HUEMDA. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2) (West
2004); see also supra note 18.
(2) Some states protect against even attempted dealer coercion. Arkansas provides an
example. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-310(b)(2) (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-
1205(b)(2) (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.844(3) (West 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-
07-01.2.3 (1999). These laws are usually phrased like the statute in Arkansas: "It is a
violation.., for a manufacturer to... [c]oerce or attempt to coerce a dealer into
refusing to purchase the equipment manufactured by another equipment
manufacturer .. " ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-310(b)(2) (2001).
(3) The third type of anti-exclusive dealing statute protects dealer investment interests in
other manufacturers. Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Maine, and South Carolina all have this
type of law. See ALA. CODE § 8-21A-3(1 1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 686.413(3)0) (West Supp. 2008) (effective July 1, 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 28-24-103(11) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1243(3)(L) (Supp. 2007); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-6-110(B) (Supp. 2007). While each state's law is slightly different,
South Carolina's law provides the simplest example: "A manufacturer may not prevent
a dealer from having an investment in or holding a dealership contract for the sale of
competing product lines or makes of equipment." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-6-110(B)
(Supp. 2007).
20. Many states do not keep records of legislative debates, committee meetings, or committee hearings.
As to the ten states that passed anti-exclusive dealing statutes from 2000 to 2007, see supra note 17, we were
only able to locate brief comments from the minutes of the Idaho House Business Committee meeting on
March 1, 2005. See Hearing on H.B. 197 Before the H. Bus. Comm., 58th Leg. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing
on H.B. 197]; see also H.B. 197, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005), 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws 730. One of the
Committee members posited that "it seems odd to be manipulating the marketplace and getting involved in
contracts between retailers and wholesalers by manipulating their agreements." Hearing on H.B. 197, supra,
at 2. Representative Block, the bill's sponsor, "explained that in the current climate, the few major farm
equipment manufacturers are able to manipulate dealer contracts with few restrictions, and dealers need these
protections to remain viable businesses." Id. The Committee also heard testimony in favor of the bill from
Ron Moore, a representative from the Pacific Northwest Hardware and Implement Association. See id. at 1.
According to Mr. Moore, "dealers are in a poor bargaining position with manufacturers. In most cases, the
dealers have to accept whatever terms are presented to them by the manufacturers." Id at 1-2. This concern
is evident in many dealer protection statutes. See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, WIS. STAT.
2008]
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these laws have existed for several years, dealers did not resort to them and, until now,
courts did not interpret them.
2 1
II. RECENT GUIDANCE FROM THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS
Recently, two dealers claimed that manufacturers violated anti-exclusive dealing
statutes by enforcing exclusive dealing provisions.
The two circuit courts of appeals reviewing the applicable statutes reached at least
partly conflicting results. The Eighth Circuit, in Minnesota Supply Co. v. Raymond
Corp., upheld a manufacturer's right to terminate its dealer that violated an exclusive
dealing clause because the dealer eventually bought from the competing
manufacturer. 23 Hence, according to the court, there was only "attempted," not actual,
i.e., actionable, coercion. 24 The Sixth Circuit, though, in NACCO Materials Handling
Group, Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc.,25 upheld a preliminary injunction
ruling that deemed an exclusive dealing agreement potentially "coercive" despite the
dealer's purchases from a competing manufacturer. 26 Both courts sought to enforce
state anti-exclusive dealing laws without invalidating all exclusive dealing clauses.
Trying to balance these conflicting goals led the Eighth Circuit to largely eviscerate the
Minnesota anti-exclusive dealing statute2 7 and caused the Sixth Circuit to defer
defining coercion under the Tennessee law to another day.
28
A. Minnesota Supply: A Limited View of Coercive Exclusive Dealing
Minnesota Supply was a dealer of Raymond lift trucks. 29 Minnesota Supply was
the only Raymond dealer in Minnesota and the parties worked without an exclusive deal
for several decades. The parties "updated" their agreement in 1990. 31  A new
provision in the agreement allowed Raymond to terminate Minnesota Supply's
dealership if it sold competing lift trucks without Raymond's consent. 32
In 1992, Minnesota Supply decided to add a competing line of Caterpillar lift
§ 135.025(2)(b) (2006) (providing that the purpose of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law is "[t]o protect
dealers against unfair treatment by grantors, who inherently have superior economic power and superior
bargaining power in the negotiation of dealerships").
21. See, e.g., NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (noting the "absence" of case law interpreting anti-
exclusive dealing statutes).
22. 472 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2006).
23. Id. at 539 ("Because § 325E.0682(b)(2) only prohibits coercion that results in a dealer's refusal to
purchase equipment manufactured by another manufacturer and it is undisputed that [Minnesota] Supply did
not refuse to purchase the Caterpillar lift trucks, we reverse ....
24. See id. at 538.
25. 246 F. App'x 929 (6th Cir. 2007).
26. See id. at 947-50.
27. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
29. Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d at 529.
30. See Brief of Appellant at 12, Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d 524 (No. 04-1416) [hereinafter Raymond
Brief]; Briefof Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross Appellant at 7, Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d 524 (No. 04-1416).
31. Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d at 529.
32. Id.
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trucks to its product line. 33 Instead of terminating Minnesota Supply's license to sell
Raymond products or forcing it to drop the Caterpillar line, Raymond proposed (or
demanded, depending upon one's vantage point) changes to the dealership agreement.
34
In an amendment to the parties' agreement, Minnesota Supply agreed to create a new
division for the sale of the competing Caterpillar products and maintain Raymond's
existing market share for Raymond lift trucks. 35 If Minnesota Supply did not comply,
Raymond had the right to terminate.
36
After agreeing to the new provision, Minnesota Supply began selling the competing
line of Caterpillar lift trucks. 37 When Raymond's market share dropped, it terminated
the agreement. 
38
Minnesota Supply sued Raymond, claiming that Raymond violated three provisions
in Minnesota's Heavy and Utility Equipment Manufacturers and Dealers Act
(HUEMDA). 39 The anti-exclusive dealing part of HUEMDA makes it illegal to
"coerce an equipment dealer into a refusal to purchase the equipment manufactured by- .40
another equipment manufacturer. Minnesota Supply argued that Raymond's
termination threat coerced it into choosing between agreeing to the market share
amendment or refusing to sell Caterpillar trucks. 4 1  Raymond countered that since
Minnesota Supply did purchase and sell Caterpillar trucks, there was no coercion
prohibited by HUEMDA; it was simply enforcing the parties' agreement. 42 Minnesota
Supply won a jury verdict.
43
The Eighth Circuit, however, sided with Raymond. 44 To violate HUEMDA, the
court held, "a manufacturer's action must be coercive and its result must be a dealer's
refusal to purchase another manufacturer's equipment."4 5  In the present case,
HUEMDA did not protect Minnesota Supply because it did not "refuse" to purchase
another manufacturer's equipment. 46  Instead, Raymond consented to Minnesota
Supply's sale of Caterpillar lift trucks, provided Minnesota Supply met market share
requirements and created a new division.47 Raymond's threats to terminate, therefore,
33. Id. at 529-30.
34. See id. at 530.
35. Id.
36. Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d at 530.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 531; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2) (West 2007). In addition to its allegation that
Raymond violated HUEMDA's anti-coercion provision, Minnesota Supply also claimed that (1) the amended
agreement was a change in competitive circumstances imposed without good cause; and (2) Raymond's
termination of the dealership agreement was without good cause because it was based on Minnesota Supply's
failure to meet unreasonable terms set forth in the amended agreement. 472 F.3d at 531.
40. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.0682(b)(2).
41. Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d at 531.
42. Cf id. at 538.
43. See id. at 536-37. The district court instructed the jury that coercion is "conduct that constitutes the
improper use of economic power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." Id. at 536
(quoting Trial Tr. at 1908).
44. Id. at 538-39.
45. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).




"did not coerce [Minnesota] Supply into refusing to purchase another manufacturer's
equipment."
48
The court went on to explain what Minnesota's statute did not prevent: "[w]e do
not believe that HUEMDA prohibits a manufacturer from terminating a dealership
agreement with a dealer who chooses to offer competing equipment where that
termination was expressly provided for in the agreement." 49 Then, the court reached its
core objection in a footnote:
[Minnesota] Supply's interpretation of HUEMDA would effectively render
exclusivity provisions ineffectual because any provision allowing a manufacturer to
terminate an agreement once it became nonexclusive would be deemed coercive,
void, and unenforceable. Further, any attempt to bargain for an exclusivity provision
or to sue for its breach would not only be futile but could also be deemed coercive
inasmuch as it would seek to prevent the purchase of another manufacturer's
equipment. 50
The Eighth Circuit did not explain when, if ever, a manufacturer's demand is coercion
that violates HUEMDA.
B. NACCO: Same Approach, Different Result
NACCO manufactured and sold Yale forklifts. 51 Lilly Co. was the exclusive Yale
forklift dealer in Memphis and Nashville. 52 The parties had a non-exclusive dealing
relationship for years, but in 1992, the parties added a clause that "prohibited Lilly from
'sell[ing] or offer[ing] for sale ... new equipment which competes directly with Yale
Products' during the term of the [agreement]." 53  When NACCO heard rumors that
Lilly was planning on becoming a Toyota dealer as well, it threatened to terminate and
litigate against Lilly and its officers "for estimated large sums of money."
54
Still, Lilly decided to contract with Toyota in Memphis. 55 NACCO immediately
tried to terminate Lilly's Memphis and Nashville dealerships because of Lilly's breach
of the exclusive dealing provision. 56 Lilly sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 538, n.3. "Exclusivity" is a general term for a vertical restraint that (usually) refers to a
manufacturer's agreement to grant the sole right to sell a product in a certain arena. See THOMAS V.
VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 7.10, at 7-29 (Law Journal Press 1997). The term "exclusivity" is often
used interchangeably with "exclusive dealing." We have tried to maintain the distinction in this Article, but
have deferred to the courts when quoting specific passages. The manufacturer might limit the distributor to a
defined territory or customer base, to certain areas of primary responsibility, or obligate a distributor to share
profits if it sells outside its defined arena. The key is that the distributor is restricted in some manner if it sells
outside of the chosen arena.
51. NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 932.
52. NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 599.




56. Id. at 934. The court mentions that NACCO sued before Lilly entered into the contract, but offered
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early termination, 57 citing Tennessee's Repurchase of Terminated Franchise Inventory
Act. 58  That statute forbids a manufacturer from terminating a dealer without "good
cause" 59 and from "[c]oerc[ing] a retailer into refusing to purchase equipment
manufactured by another supplier." 60 Lilly argued that NACCO violated Tennessee's
statute when it threatened Lilly. 61 NACCO argued that it had "good cause" because
Lilly violated the exclusive dealing section of their agreement.
62
Finding that Lilly had "a strong likelihood of success" on the merits, 63 the district
court granted the preliminary injunction for Lilly.64  The district court reasoned that
"Yale's conduct in threatening to sue Lilly's officers and to terminate the... agreements
is coercive conduct because Yale is seeking to restrain Lilly's unwaivable right to
purchase equipment from another supplier by such threats."'65  Swayed by Lilly's
argument that the statutory "coercion" provision could not be a nullity, 66 the court
added that its interpretation "comports with the ordinary meaning of 'coerce. ' ' 67 In
short, Lilly's violation of the exclusive dealing section was not "good cause" for
termination because the clause was illegal.
68
The parties honed in on the coercion issue on appeal. 69 NACCO argued that the
district court's reading would void all exclusive dealing provisions, and that Lilly (like
the plaintiff in Minnesota Supply) was not protected because it actually contracted with
the competing manufacturer, Toyota. NACCO further reasoned that "as a dealer for a
competing forklift brand, Lilly should no longer be privy to NACCO's marketing
strategy for Yale forklifts." 71  Lilly responded that if NACCO were correct,
manufacturers could "skirt the protections set forth by the legislature by forcing retailers
to agree to exclusivity provisions in non-negotiable contracts."
72
According to the Sixth Circuit, "[w]hether NACCO engaged in unlawful coercion
in its methods enforcing the Exclusivity Provision or NACCO lawfully sought to
to withdraw the complaint if Lilly decided not to pursue a contract with Toyota. Id. Such tactics are
unsurprising since parties that continue to do business together are less likely to want to pursue litigation.
57. Id.
58. NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 601; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1301-1314 (West 2006).
59. In addition to several definitions of "good cause" not relevant here, the statute defines "good cause"
as "failure by a retailer to comply with requirements imposed upon the retailer by the retail agreement if such
requirements are not different from those imposed on other retailers similarly situated in [Tennessee]." TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-25-1302(a).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1304(3).
61. NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
62. Id.; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
63. NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
64. Id. at 611.
65. Id. at 608.
66. See id. at 607-08; see also infra note 78 and accompanying text.
67. NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 608; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1301-1314 (West 2006).
68. See NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 608 (finding that while "it is not coercion to enforce a valid
provision," NACCO's exclusivity clause did not qualify for this protection because "the statute expressly
makes the prohibited provision invalid and not subject to waiver" (emphasis added) (distinguishing Cecil
Corley Motor Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819, 843 (M.D. Tenn. 1974))).
69. See NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 936-50.
70. Id. at 940 (citing Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d 524); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71. NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 934.
72. Id. at 940.
2008]
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enforce Lilly's contractual obligation is a 'close call."' ' 73  The court assumed "for
purposes of this appeal that the mere presence of the [parties'] Exclusivity Provision
does not constitute coercion and that the Exclusivity Provision is not void and is
enforceable."
74
That said, the court refused to take the entire Minnesota Supply approach. 
75
Instead, it punted the difficult issue back to the district court: "[r]egardless of whether,
under Tennessee law, coercion is only possible if Lilly did not purchase Toyota
equipment or the trial court correctly concluded that NACCO could coerce Lilly
through its enforcement of the Exclusivity Provision, we cannot determine that Lilly
had absolutely no likelihood of success on the merits . . . ." With that, the court
upheld the district court's finding that Lilly showed a likelihood of success on the
merits in its preliminary injunction claim. 77
III. How SHOULD COURTS DEFINE COERCION?
The NACCO and Minnesota Supply courts struggled to maintain the viability of
exclusive dealing clauses while also giving meaning to the legislative prohibition
against coercion. Three courts interpreted coercion in three different ways and another
deferred an answer to another day. That is an untenable situation for dealers and
manufacturers considering whether to begin or extend an exclusive deal. Parties will
take cold comfort in proving that exclusive deal clauses are valid or invalid after
spending thousands of dollars battling over their meaning. What does coercion mean,
and when should a manufacturer feel safe asking for or enforcing its exclusive dealing
clause? The antitrust-inspired framework proposed here answers these questions and,
therefore, solves the dilemma faced by the Sixth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
First an observation: the laws must mean something. 78  Although that seems
obvious, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Minnesota Supply raises the possibility that
Minnesota's anti-exclusive dealing law is functionally meaningless. According to the
court, a dealer that does not comply with a manufacturer's exclusive-deal demands
cannot prove a violation of Minnesota's statute, even if it is terminated by the
manufacturer. 79 Actual coercion-refusing to purchase from another manufacturer-is
73. Id. at 941.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
76. See NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 941.
77. Id.
78. Basic canons of statutory interpretation counsel against courts "reading out" statutory language. See,
e.g., GEORGE COSTELLO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 12 (2006) ("(S]tatutes should be construed 'so as to avoid rendering
superfluous' any statutory language." (quoting Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
112 (1991))). The district court in NACCO wrestled with this idea when it noted that "coercion" must mean
something or else it would "read out" the anti-waiver provision in Tennessee Code Section 47-25-1313. See
NACCO, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 607 ("Although Yale maintains that it can only 'coerce' Lilly under the statute
when the agreement is being entered into, such a construction of the statute would seem to leave § 47-25-1313
with no effect.").
79. Minnesota Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 F.3d 524, 538 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a dealer
must "refuse" to purchase another manufacturer's equipment and discussing the viability of exclusive deals);
see also supra notes 45-46, 49 and accompanying text.
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a must. Yet consider that scenario: Manufacturer A actually coerces a dealer into
refusing to purchase products from Manufacturer B. From whom will the dealer then
purchase products? Manufacturer A, of course. Since the dealer will have to continue
to conduct business with Manufacturer A, a lawsuit is not a viable option for the
dealer. 81
The next easiest boundary to draw is maintaining the viability of exclusive dealing
clauses. Courts will not simply find that all exclusive dealing provisions are void.
Instead, most will follow the Sixth and Eighth Circuits' lead and disregard the "ordinary
meaning of the term 'coerce ' '.82 to avoid invalidating all exclusive dealing provisions.
This treatment is reminiscent of judicial views of the Sherman Act's prohibition of
"every contract . . . in restraint of trade." 83 That is a sensible result in light of the
abundance of exclusive deals throughout industry, although the courts' methods of
arriving at that result might deprive the anti-exclusive dealing statutes of meaning.
Statutory antitrust law establishes another boundary that neither NACCO nor
Minnesota Supply discussed. Presumably, anti-exclusive dealing laws are not redundant
or superfluous. 84 It is illogical to presume that statutory language discussing the need
to protect dealers invalidates only conduct that is already illegal. 85 It is safe to assume
that anti-exclusive dealing statutes are not concerned with monopoly, attempted
monopoly, or harm to competition through market foreclosure. What's the point?
Legislators presumably understand that federal and state antitrust laws already protect
competition. The corollary to that point is that legislators are probably not concerned
that manufacturers would force distributors to conspire to enforce the manufacturer's
monopoly. 86 That conduct is already illegal. In short, because the "essential antitrust
issue is how to determine when aggressive conduct ... destroys 'competition itself,'
' 87
anti-exclusive dealing statutes must fill a different niche.
Although antitrust law is not determinative, antitrust analysis helps identify that
niche. Antitrust commentators assume that the risks inherent in exclusive deals limit
the chance that those deals will harm competition. 88  A manufacturer is unlikely to
receive an exclusive deal without compensating a dealer. 89 Hence, it risks finding itself
stuck with a dealer to whom it granted exclusivity for the long-term in states with pro-
dealer laws 90 or reducing its margins to keep the exclusive deal in place. 9 1 Dealers
80. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
81. Cf. supra note 56 and accompanying text.
82. NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc. v. Toyota Materials Handling USA, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d
597, 608 (W.D. Tenn. 2004), affid in part, rev'don other grounds, 246 Fed. App'x 929 (6th Cir. 2007).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2713 (2007) ("While § I could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts..., the Court has never taken a 'literal
approach to [its] language."'(quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. See Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
86. Benjamin Klein, Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution "On the Merits," 12 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 119, 124-25 (2003).
87. Id. at 119.
88. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 231 (2d ed. 2001) (examining United Shoe Mach. Co v.
United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), and noting that United's customers would be unlikely to help United
garner a monopoly without sufficient compensation).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wis. STAT. §§ 135.01-07 (2006).
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face an even greater risk. As Richard Posner explains:
[T]he distributor who agrees to carry the goods of only one producer as part of a
scheme to give the producer a monopoly assumes a big risk. Once the producer
achieves a monopoly, the distributor will be at [the producer's] mercy unless the
terms of [the distributor's] contract with the producer prevent the latter from later
charging... a monopoly price or compensate ... for the future exactions.
92
For present purposes, Posner's explanation of dealer risk raises two obvious
questions: (1) What happens to a distributor who agrees to carry the goods of only one
producer for some reason other than assisting a manufacturer's monopoly; and (2) What
if a manufacturer is not a monopolist, but can force the dealer to agree to unfavorable
terms? The answer is that in some cases, those dealers are protected by state anti-
exclusive dealing laws.
To help illustrate why, consider a manufacturer who, to enter the market, offers a
dealer exclusivity in a chosen territory (a common vertical restraint) and does not
demand an exclusive deal. 93  The manufacturer is a recent entrant; falling prey to a
monopolist is not a concern for the dealer. The exclusivity will also benefit the dealer
and the manufacturer in a number of ways. It will reduce margin-lowering cutthroat
competition, ensure that dealers that invest in customer service and promotion are not
undercut by free-riders and, in so doing, help the manufacturer build a dealer network.
94
Notice also that if the manufacturer never offers the possibility of higher profits to
sell its product (in our example, the exclusivity vertical restraint), it will probably not
overcome the dealer's reluctance to join a distributor network for a new product.
Likewise, if a manufacturer does not give a dealer a reason to believe that it will
achieve higher profits selling the manufacturer's product, a dealer will be less willing to
make extra investments to sell the product.
At the outset of this hypothetical relationship the bargaining power could be on
either side. The key is that the parties are on a level playing field in that neither party is
invested in the relationship. But once both parties have received the mutual benefit of
the contract, the power can shift to one side or the other. Many legislatures, as
evidenced by dealer laws, believe that the power usually shifts to the manufacturer.
95
That power shift is of no consequence in antitrust law if a substantial part of the market
is not foreclosed. 96 The party with more power will simply continue to extract the best
91. POSNER, supra note 88, at 231.
92. Id. at 230.
93. Cf supra note 50.
94. One of the reasons manufacturers have exclusivity agreements is to encourage dealers to promote its
product over those of a competitor (i.e., interbrand competition). See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 20.
96. See Klein, supra note 86, at 123; see also supra note 12. That is not to say that the "locus of power"
is irrelevant to antitrust analysis. Warren Grimes recently recognized that "the locus of power in a vertical
relationship strongly affects competitive outcomes in the distribution system." Warren S. Grimes, The Future
of Distribution Restraints Law: Will the New Learning Take Hold?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 885, 889. But as he
explains, the locus of power is important to judge anticompetitive effects, e.g., exclusion of competitors. Id.
at 908.
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terms it can from the relationship. If no competitors are excluded from selling in the
market, life goes on.
97
Addressing this power shift between a dealer and manufacturer is a logical niche
for the state anti-exclusive dealing laws, however. The laws are, in essence, additional
protection for dealers facing the risks mentioned above.
That protection is necessary when there is a power shift and after some sort of
enticement to enter into the relationship. After the power shift, the manufacturer of an
established product has its choice of dealers and can demand an exclusive deal, but the
dealer that made mutually beneficial investments cannot demand adequate
compensation for the "future exactions." 98  Since it is the power shift that allows
statutory coercion, anti-exclusive dealing laws logically must be aimed at the parties'
renegotiation, not the initial agreement when a dealer can demand future exactions for
an exclusive deal without concern over its investments. 99
Put another way, the laws seek to restore the parties' bargaining position to the time
the manufacturer first offered the dealer an enticement to invest in and sell its product.
By restoring the parties to a theoretically level playing field, anti-exclusive dealing laws
allow a dealer to fairly assess what compensation it wants for an exclusive deal and
prevent a manufacturer from using the mutual benefit of dealer investments (made
because of the enticement) to its sole advantage.
Thus, to find "coercion" under state anti-exclusive dealing laws, courts should look
for the following:
(1) A manufacturer's enticement (e.g, exclusivity) to a dealer to sell the
manufacturer's product. If the dealer is never given an enticement to sell the
manufacturer's product (beyond a mere license), there is less opportunity for
unfairness.
(2) Proof that the manufacturer has benefited from the added enticement. If the
manufacturer has not benefited from the enticement, it will not have gained
leverage at the dealer's expense.
(3) A renegotiation in which the manufacturer demands exclusive dealing.
(4) Finally, proof that the manufacturer insisted on the exclusive deal without giving
a dealer compensation close to or equivalent to the "future exactions" the dealer
could have demanded at the outset of the relationship.
By using these steps, a court can uphold contractual exclusive deals, while also giving
97. Grimes, supra note 96, at 908.
98. POSNER, supra note 88, at 230.
99. Indeed, the logic of looking to renegotiation is supported by many of the statutes that require dealers
to show a dealership. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.068 (West 2007).
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meaning to the word "coercion" and the anti-exclusive dealing statutes generally. It
also saves a court from trying to determine whether a dealer actually felt pressured by a
manufacturer's actions at the end of the relationship-an inquiry that is more
appropriate for criminal or tort law-in favor of looking to the parties' entire
relationship.
This framework is also a starting point for answering two tricky questions: (1) what
to do with "attempted" or unsuccessful coercion; 10 and (2) how to address a
manufacturer's right to enter into an exclusive deal.
Antitrust again provides useful analysis. 101 One commentator recently noted that
the key to understanding illegal vertical conduct is whether the manufacturer's request
for an exclusive deal involves an incentive or merely a take-it-or-leave-it (refusal to
deal) proposition to prevent the distributor from engaging another manufacturer. 102 As
Kenneth Glazer, Deputy Director of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of
Competition, explains, the incentivizing manufacturer does not demand an exclusive
deal. 103 Instead, it says, "I would like you to buy my product exclusively and not
purchase from competitors, but I don't insist on that. . . . But if you buy from me
exclusively, then I'll give you a better price, an extra discount or bonus." 
104
Glazer's theory is helpful here. When examining alleged attempted coercion, a
court should ask whether the manufacturer sought to stop its distributor from engaging
another manufacturer by offering an incentive or by offering take-it-or-leave-it terms.
To determine whether conduct is coercive or incentivizing the court should look to the
difference between the new offer and the parties' original deal. For example, if an
incentivizing manufacturer says upon renegotiation, "I now want an exclusive deal. I
am offering our exclusive dealers a cheaper price than we initially negotiated," a dealer
cannot complain of actionable coercive conduct. If, on the other hand, a manufacturer
says, "I want an exclusive deal. If you do not accept, I am reducing your original
territory," the dealer might have a claim. Again, the advantage here is that the court and
parties will look to the entire relationship, including the enticement or bait that was
initially offered to convince the dealer to invest in selling the manufacturer's product.
Moreover, it avoids the Minnesota Supply result where a manufacturer was able to force
a dealer to choose between allegedly unfair terms and buying from another
manufacturer. As discussed, such results deprive the statutes of meaning.
The coercion-versus-incentive scenario also applies to a manufacturer's right to
renegotiate an exclusive deal with its distributors. Simply put, a manufacturer that
wants to avoid violating anti-exclusive dealing laws should approach existing dealers
100. Recall that some states' anti-exclusive dealing laws protect against attempted coercion. See supra
note 19 (describing statutes in Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and North Dakota).
101. See Kenneth L. Glazer, Three Key Exceptions Under Section 2, Antitrust Modernization Comm'n,
September 29, 2005, http://www.amc.gov/commissionjhearings/pdf/Glazer.pdf [hereinafter Written Hearing
Testimony]; see also Exclusionary Conduct: Refusals to Deal and Bundling and Loyalty Discounts: Hearing
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm 'n, http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/pdf/
050929.ExclusConductTranscript-reform.pdf (a transcript of the hearing). Mr. Glazer's comments to the
Antitrust Modernization Commission were given in his capacity as counsel for Coca-Cola, Co. Mr. Glazer
has since been appointed to Deputy Director of the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition.
102. Written Hearing Testimony, supra note 101, at 8.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id.
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with carrots rather than sticks. 10 5  Manufacturers should document and explain the
incentive offered to gain an exclusive deal through a renegotiation. 10 6  To be
completely safe, the manufacturer (or its lawyer) would determine what compensation
would fairly compensate the dealer for benefits the manufacturer received from
investments its dealer made due to the manufacturer's enticements. The closer the
manufacturer is to that point the safer it will be, although requiring perfect alignment
would be unreasonable. 107 Also, the adequate compensation does not have to be a high
number. Certainly, dealers will ask for the moon, but the manufacturer should retain
the right to show that it offered a fair incentive when it asked for the exclusive deal. A
manufacturer which offers a fair incentive (one tied to the benefits of manufacturer-
enticed dealer investments) that is rejected by its dealer is not coercing that dealer if the
manufacturer takes its business elsewhere. 108
A manufacturer's need to determine fair compensation also highlights the
importance of the proposed framework's requirements of renegotiation and an
enticement. An initial exclusive deal is fair because the requisite compensation is
obvious; it is whatever the dealer asks for. Likewise, if a manufacturer never offered an
enticement, pegging fair compensation for a new exclusive deal is easy; it is whatever
the dealer now accepts, since it was selling the product without any encouragement
from the manufacturer to make extra investments. Presumably, the dealer has invested
in growing its business and will sell more of whatever is the most profitable product. If
a manufacturer wants to extract more of that profit, it can try to do so and the dealer can
ask for compensation. If that compensation is insufficient, the dealer will turn to the
investments it has made in its own business to sell other, more profitable, products.
105. See generally Willard K. Tom et al., Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other
Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615 (2000). However, the manufacturer must not reach
the point of violating antitrust laws. See id. at 622 (noting that "antitrust laws normally encourage discounts
and price reductions," but warning that anticompetitive effects are still possible).
106. See id. at 615 ("[R]ather than requiring absolute exclusivity, a manufacturer simply may give a more
favorable price to customers who purchase more than a certain percentage of their requirements from the
manufacturer."). Other examples include loyalty discounts and rebates. Any incentive short of predatory
pricing should escape judicial condemnation under antitrust law or the anti-exclusive dealing statutes. See
Written Hearing Testimony, supra note 101, at 9.
107. Another point to consider is whether manufacturers can avoid exclusive dealing statutes in another
manner while receiving the same benefits. The Supreme Court's recent Leegin decision suggests that the
answer is yes. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). In Leegin, the
Court said that resale price maintenance (RPM) was not per se illegal. Id. at 2725. As the Court noted, "[t]he
justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for other vertical restraints." Id. at 2716. A
minimum resale price agreement might encourage a retailer to promote or service certain brands, while
ensuring that the high-service retailer is not undercut by free-riders that merely offer a cheaper price or it
might facilitate entry into the market by smaller or new brands. Id. at 2718. Since RPM offers what vertical
exclusivity offers, some manufacturers can avoid entering into exclusive dealership agreements and, instead,
retain flexibility in using dealers, avoid dealership laws and so on. Theoretically, assuming the equivalent
impact upon margins, a manufacturer that initially offers RPM and then later demands an exclusive deal
should be treated the same as a manufacturer that offers exclusivity and then demands an exclusive deal.
Practically speaking that probably will not be the case since RPM can be achieved without resort to a
dealership contract that is often the starting point for analysis of manufacturer and dealer relationships.
Moreover, the manufacturer demanding an exclusive deal will have a stronger hand since it will have other
dealers in the same area. Hence, anti-exclusive dealing statutes and Leegin should decrease the number of
manufacturers granting exclusivity, but will probably increase the number of manufacturers that avoid anti-
exclusive dealing statutes.
108. Conceivably, a manufacturer could show that even though it coerced its dealer into accepting an
exclusive deal, the dealer had garnered enough benefit to expunge the manufacturer's deeds.
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO NACCO AND MINNESOTA SUPPLY
If the Sixth and Eighth Circuits had used the rubric outlined above, they might have
reached different results. The Minnesota Supply court, at the very least, did not
consider all of the necessary facts. 109  Recall that in Minnesota Supply, the parties
entered into an agreement in 1947.110 Minnesota Supply was given an exclusive
territory. 111 Raymond requested an exclusive deal in 1990.112  In 1993, Raymond
enforced its exclusive deal by forcing Minnesota Supply to choose between not selling
Caterpillar trucks or selling Caterpillar trucks and then choosing termination or lower
profits (lower profits being the obvious result of creating a new division and
guaranteeing market share). 113 Faced with these facts the Eighth Circuit focused only
on outcomes, i.e., whether Raymond had the right to request an exclusive deal and
whether Minnesota Supply actually accepted termination, lower profits, or an exclusive
deal with Raymond.
Minnesota Supply wrongly focused on the end result. 114 The dealer's real gripe
was that Raymond used the 1990 exclusive deal to exact unfair contract terms after the
parties had conducted business without an exclusive deal for several decades. If
Raymond never enticed Minnesota Supply to invest in Raymond products, if Raymond
never gained power from Minnesota Supply's investments, or if Raymond offered
incentives for the exclusive deal in 1990, Raymond's actions to enforce the exclusive
deal in 1993 are unimportant. Conversely, if Raymond used the power it gained from
Minnesota Supply's investments in the relationship to coerce Minnesota Supply into an
exclusive deal in 1990, its continued use of that leverage to extract new promises should
not matter either. The Eighth Circuit's analysis ignores all of these fundamental
questions.
Although the outcome was slightly different, the NA CCO approach was similar to
the Minnesota Supply approach. 115 After a long relationship, NACCO renegotiated the
parties' contract in 1992 to include an exclusive dealing clause. 116 NACCO argued that
Lilly voluntarily agreed to the new clause, 117 but neither party showed how, if at all,
NACCO compensated Lilly for the new exclusive dealing clause. Instead, Lilly argued
109. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
110. Minnesota Supply Co. v. Raymond Corp., 472 F.3d 524, 529 (8th Cir. 2006).
111. According to Raymond's Court of Appeals Brief, Minnesota Supply was the only Raymond dealer in
Minnesota for many years. See Raymond Brief, supra note 30, at 12.
112. Minnesota Supply, 472 F.3d at 529. The court did not say whether Minnesota Supply received any
compensation for that change or whether Raymond had benefited through the vertical restraint it offered
Minnesota Supply in the previous 43 years.
113. Id. at 530.
114. See id. at 538 n.3. The court might have signaled that it recognized this issue by stating, "[t]here is
no evidence that [Minnesota] Supply was coerced into accepting [the exclusive deal], nor that [Minnesota]
Supply ever challenged the legality of [the exclusive deal] while enjoying the benefits of the agreement." Id.
at 538. Even so, the court probably forced future courts to look only to the end result of possible coercion by
requiring that a dealer actually refuse to purchase from another supplier.
115. See supra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
116. NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 934.
117. NACCO's argument refutes a possible objection to the suggested framework. Determining whether a
party offered incentives several years after a contract was executed raises evidentiary issues. However,
similar evidentiary issues arise whenever contracts are disputed.
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that it was coerced when NACCO threatened to terminate and litigate if Lilly violated
the clause. 118  Again, whether the manufacturer said it was going to enforce its
exclusive deal should not matter. Instead, the manufacturer's framing was correct. If
Lilly truly voluntarily agreed to the 1992 change because the manufacturer offered it a
fair deal (incentives), then NACCO had every right to enforce the clause. Lilly simply
miscalculated the cost (required future exactions) of the exclusive deal. If Lilly was
coerced, i.e., did not receive any incentive for entering into the renegotiated exclusive
deal that acknowledged its investments, then NACCO's continued attempts to leverage
its power add flavor to, but do not change, the outcome.
CONCLUSION
Courts analyzing anti-exclusive dealing laws face a dilemma: how to balance
manufacturers' right to use exclusive dealing with legislatures' stated desire to forbid
coercive exclusive deals. The Minnesota Supply and NACCO courts both struggled
with that question. Minnesota Supply came down firmly on the side of allowing an
exclusive deal, but possibly ignored legislative intent. The NACCO court seemed to
begrudgingly find that the manufacturer might have violated the Tennessee statute and
then sent the issue back to the district court. In both cases, the courts looked to the most
recent actions by the parties. As is shown above, both courts would have been better
served by developing evidence regarding the benefit the parties received from their
deals and the manufacturers' actions when the exclusive deal was consummated. If
courts look to the entire relationship instead of focusing only on how each manufacturer
enforces an exclusive dealing clause in an otherwise valid contract, they will go a long
way towards solving the dilemma posed by anti-exclusive dealing statutes.
118. NACCO, 246 Fed. App'x at 935.
2008]
